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0 VER THIRY-ONE years ago, the Soviet Union's
launch of the first communications satellite, Sputnik,
sent shock waves throughout the global community.' Not
only did this Soviet planetary experiment initiate the su-
perpowers' race in space, but it also suggested that satel-
lites would some day carry broadcast signals directly to
home receivers in foreign countries.2 The United States
response was a $30 billion investment in its fledgling
space program, resulting in its first successful satellite
launch just fourteen months later. The commercial era
for satellite telecommunications was initiated when the
United States Congress passed the Communications Sat-
ellite Act of 1962,4 which created a private corporation,
the Communications Satellite Corporation (COMSAT), as
the United States "carriers' carrier" for satellite telecom-
munications.5 COMSAT was given the task of operating
* J.D. Southern Methodist University; Associate, Ray Trotti Hemphill & Fin-
frock, Dallas, Texas.
1 R. WHITE & H. WHITE, THE LAW AND REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE
COMMUNICATION 235 (1988); see also A. BELENDIUK & S. ROBB, BROADCASTING VIA
SATELLITE: LEGAL AND BUSINESS CONSIDERATIONS 1 (1979) (providing a general
overview of satellite broadcasting techniques and the resulting issues).
2 K. QUEENEY, DIRECT BROADCAST SATELLITES AND THE UNITED NATIONS 13
(1978).
3 A. BELENDIUK & S. ROBB, supra note 1, at 2.
4 Communications Satellite Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-624, 76 Stat. 419 (codi-
fied as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 701-757 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)).
Id. at § 731; A. BELENDIUK & S. ROBB, supra note 1, at 4.
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the United States portion of the International Telecom-
munications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT), one of
only two global satellite systems.6
INTELSAT launched its first satellite, Early Bird, in
1965 and has maintained a monopoly on international sat-
ellite communications routes into the mid-1980s by non-
discriminatory price averaging and economies of scale.7
INTELSAT is currently owned jointly by 114 govern-
ments." One of its first telecasts was a Soviet track meet
transmitted "live" to the United States with a total satel-
lite capacity of 240 telephone circuits and one television
channel, which represents a primitive contrast to the pres-
ent generation of INTELSAT VI satellites that provide
12,000 telephone circuits and two color video circuits si-
multaneously. 9 The INTERSPUTNIK Satellite System
that was created by the Soviet Union in 1968 provides
global coverage with its Statsionar-T and 1-10 series of C-
Band satellites, which are designed for community direct
broadcast satellite (DBS) reception, rather than point-to-
point reception, as provided by most INTELSAT
payloads. 10
The communications, research, and military defense
needs of many countries have added to the proliferation
of orbiting satellites of all types."I In addition to the in-
ternational INTELSAT and INTERSPUTNIK consorti-
6 W. HOWELL, WORLD BROADCASTING IN THE AGE OF THE SATELLITE 252 (1986).
7 Id. at 253. The first regional satellite venture to challenge INTELSAT came
in 1980 when 21 nations of the Arab League decided to develop the ARABSAT
system which was launched in 1984. Id.; see Payne, Earth to INTELSAT: The Party's
Over, BUSINESS WEEK, Sept. 5, 1988, at 94 (INTELSAT is also being challenged by
its first international satellite competitor, Pan American Satellite Corporation
(PanAmSat), which recently launched its first satellite).
6 Payne, supra note 7, at 94; see A. BELENDIUK & S. ROBB, supra note 1, at 5-7; see
also Pirrotti, The Global Satellite Cooperative: Is The U.S. Cooperating?, 9 COMM. & LAW
57 (1987) (discussing whether the United States is living up to its commitment to
INTELSAT).
9 A. BELENDIUK & S. ROBB, supra note 1, at 5.
io W. HOWELL, supra note 6, at 252.
I S. AYALA, Current Status and Expected Developments in the Area of Satellite Communi-
cations in the Latin American and Caribbean Region, NASA TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM
(1986).
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ums, there are now in the geostationary orbit (GSO)12
many fixed satellite (regional/multinational broadcast)
services such as the ANIK satellites from Canada, the
MOLNIYA, GORIZONT and EKRAN from the Soviet
Union, and EUTELSAT and OTS in Europe. 13  Addi-
tional services include Japan's SAKURA, Indonesia's
PALAPA, India's INSAT, the Arabic nations' ARABSAT,
Brazil's BRASILSAT, Australia's AUSSAT, and Mexico's
MORELOS. 14
This technological opportunity to cross national bound-
aries and reach citizens of other nations is accomplished
by increasing the radiation power of distribution satel-
lites. 15 The signals emitted by direct broadcast satellites
(DBS) are receivable directly by conventional radio and
television -sets.' 6  If the radiation power is not strong
enough for unaugmented radio and television receivers,
small antennae and converters are capable of augmenting
domestic sets. 17 As DBS technology develops, therefore,
elimination of complex antennae and sophisticated earth
stations may result. Satellite telecommunications, how-
ever, are impossible without the proper radio links that
reduce transmission interference.' 8 Although satellites
are technically used for earth-bound activities, the princi-
21 The geostationary orbit is an orbit 22,300 miles over the earth's equator. At
this distance, the satellite's period of rotation equals the earth's; therefore, a satel-
lite in the GSO appears to be in a stationary position when compared to a desig-
nated point on earth. One DBS in the GSO can broadcast to at least one-third of
the earth's surface such that only three satellites in this orbit are theoretically nec-
essary for global telecommunications services. N. MATrE, AEROSPACE LAw: TELE-
COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITES 6-7 (1982). Each geostationary satellite covers a
surface area of about 1,000,000 square miles. Dauses, Direct Television Broadcasting
by Satellites and Freedom of Information, 3 J. SPACE L. 59 (1975).
3 S. AYALA, supra note 11, at 4.
14 Id.
5 N. MATrE, supra note 12, at 8.
6 Id.
17 Id. A few states have already experimented with the use of such satellites and
the favorable results indicate that DBS will be available for widespread television
broadcasts in the future. Id.
18 Id. at 9. "Mutual harmful interference will occur if two or more radio stations
(transmitters) [are] simultaneously transmitting radio signals on the same radio
frequency in the same area." Id. at 2.
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ples of aerospace law govern their potential for harmful
interference. 19
The information transferred over DBS is regarded as a
politically sensitive issue that requires supervision by gov-
ernmental or intergovermental agencies.2 ' The interna-
tional debates surrounding the control of DBS and its
effects have focused upon the political, social, economic,
and technological environments into which it is intro-
duced. 2' Furthermore, with INTELSAT and INTER-
SPUTNIK global systems in place, the DBS controversy
raises critical issues about the appropriate role of govern-
ments in broadcast regulation and the individual's rights
to freedom of speech and free flow of information. 22
The United Nations (UN) has provided the institutional
framework within which the legal and political implica-
tions of DBS have evolved. 2 3 The initiatives were dele-
gated to the Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
(COPUOS), whose function is to promote the coordina-
tion, review, and encouragement of terrestrial experi-
ments. 4 Two other specialized agencies of the United
Nations, the International Telecommunication Union
(ITU) and the United Nations Educational Scientific and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO), have contributed to-
i, Id. at 9. The placement of satellites in the aerospace medium brings the
satellites within the realm of aerospace law. Id.
2 Id. at 12. The International Telecomunication Union (ITU) was originally
founded in 1846 to establish international regulations for telegraphy. Id. at 85.
ITU conventions, however, have subsequently been expanded to include DBS is-
sues. Id. at 93. Several international satellite organizations have also formed
along political lines, such as the Western-oriented INTELSAT and the Socialist-
oriented INTERSPUTNIK. Id. at 13.
21 Id. at 14. "The increased participation of developing States in telecommuni-
cations satellites and in the efforts to establish a technological link between devel-
oped States are perhaps two of the most important political and legal problems
awaiting an equitable and generally acceptable solution." Id.
22 Id. at 186.
23 K. QUEENEY, supra note 2, at 12.
21 See Review of the Activities and Resources of the United Nations and Its Specialized
Agencies and of Other Competent International Bodies Relating to the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space, Report of COPUOS, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/83 (1967); K. QUEENEY, supra note
2, at 12.
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ward international agreement in the field of DBS.25 The
ITU, which regulates telecommunications on an interna-
tional level, has accommodated DBS systems by allocating
frequency bands on the radio spectrum and by coordinat-
ing the systems technically to prevent signal interference
and to make optimal use of the spectrum or orbits. 6 All
regulatory policies as applied by the member govern-
ments are agreed to at the ITU's Plenipotentiary and Ad-
ministrative Conferences.27 Additionally, UNESCO has
developed programs to encourage the free flow of infor-
mation, the spread of education, and greater cultural
exchange.28
The purpose of this article is to examine the controver-
sial arguments for and against the regulation of DBS and
to examine various strategies of international broadcast
regulation, including technical restrictions on satellite op-
erations, parameters on program content, a requirement
to obtain the prior consent of the receiving country, and
guidelines for spillover. The article will also review the
DBS debate in the United Nations as well as the specific
regulation initiatives and their outcomes. The article next
analyzes the technical and economic assumptions of DBS
globalization, the advantages of a global DBS system, and
the remaining problems hampering international cooper-
ation. Finally, the article will discuss the emerging tech-
nology and conclude with observations on the future of
DBS systems.
II. DEBATE OVER INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF
DIRECT BROADCAST SATELLITES
The COPUOS Working Group on Direct Broadcast
Satellites directed the initial discussions on DBS regula-
2 K. QUEENEY, supra note 2, at 12.
26 Butler, World Administrative Radio Conference for Planning Broadcasting Satellite
Service, 5J. SPACE L. 93 (1977); see International Telecommunications Convention,
1973, 23 U.S.T. 1527, T.I.A.S. No. 7345, 610 U.N.T.S. 205.
27 Butler, supra note 26, at 93.
28 K. QUEENEY, supra note 2, at 12. UNESCO sponsored studies on communica-
tion satellites as early as 1962. Id. at 118.
1990] 907
908 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [55
tion. 9 One early report of the group indicated that DBS
development promised improved communications and
understanding between various world cultures.3 0 But, the
group acknowledged potential disagreements could arise
if the technology were abused. The areas of concern in-
cluded: (1) propaganda, incitement, and interference pro-
grams; (2) programs using violence, obscenity, and
subliminal advertising; and (3) programs with the poten-
tial to undermine national integrity.3' The COPUOS
Working Group recognized that DBS technology could
usurp national control of telecommunications in receiving
states and raise legal questions about national sover-
eignty, international responsibility and liability, the pro-
tection of copyrights, and the rights of interpretative
artists and performers.3 2 The most critical concern of the
working group was the relationship between the individ-
ual's fundamental right to the free flow of information
and the national sovereignty of states over their
airspace. 3
In several sessions, the Soviet Union and the less devel-
oped countries (LDCs) made the argument that, without
international regulation, DBS would be used to export
imperialistic Western culture, ideology, and commercial-
ism.3 4 One premise was that if American programs and
commercials on DBS were transmitted to develop new
product markets in foreign countries, they could stimulate
premature demand for the products and thereby damage
the capital investment, education, and health of the re-
29 R. WHITE & H. WHITE, supra note 1, at 243. The purpose of the Working
Group was to analyze the technical feasibility and the social, cultural, and legal
effects of communication by DBS. G.A. Res. 2453, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18)
at 9, U.N. Doc. A/7462 (1968).
10 R. WHITE & H. WHITE, supra note 1, at 245 (summarizing, Committee Report by
COPUOS, Working Group on Direct Broadcast Satellites, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/50
(1969)).
" Id. at 246.
'2 Dauses, supra note 12, at 60.
Is Id.; see Goedhuis, Prelimina?y Report and Questionnaire on the Legal Aspects of the
Use of Direct Broadcasting Satellites, 56th CONF. OF THE INT'L LAW AssocIATION 6
(1974-75).
s4 K. QUEENEY, supra note 2, at 59.
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ceiving nation.3 5  The presumption was that big busi-
nesses would buy advertising time in lands where their
products were not available for sale. This argument, how-
ever, raises a question as to why any company would want
to buy expensive advertising time in a foreign country
where no opportunity exists to capitalize on its
36promotions.
Another argument raised the concern that the illiterate
population of the receiving nations would be the pawns of
"mind controlling" programs by foreign broadcasters. 7
To thwart these perceived abuses, the Soviet Union and
the LDCs demanded legal norms to regulate DBS. 3' This
argument for regulation is closely aligned with "statist"
assumptions of power and culture. That is, because the
state cannot be defined apart from the culture of its peo-
ple, any alien influence that affects or changes the culture
will fundamentally alter the state.39 The state, therefore,
must establish barriers to any outside influences. These
fears of cultural effects were motivated not only by a de-
sire to control program content but also by a belief that
only a small number of countries would be able to afford
the DBS technology that loomed on the horizon.4 °
The United States opposes DBS regulation on the basis
that a state has the sovereign right to transmit interna-
tional broadcasts, and restrictions on program content are
seen as violations of the first amendment of the United
s5 Id. at 50.
36 Id. at 59.
-7 Paul, Images From Abroad: Making Direct Broadcasting by Satellites Safe for Sover-
eignty, 9 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMp. L. REV. 329, 330 (1986). "Fear that the DBS will
be abused to export Western culture . . . [has] produced demands for interna-
tional regulation. [This] fear[], though not wholly unfounded, exaggerate[s] the
potential of DBS. In fact, DBS will operate under economic constraints which will
limit their scope and function for some time." Id.
3s N. MATrE, supra note 12, at 186.
39 Paul, supra note 37, at 341.
40 K. QUEENEY, supra note 2, at 36. The three factors motivating these fears
were the following: "(1) the need for domestic control and approval of program
content; (2) the belief that DBS operational systems were imminent; and (3) the
realization that only a few states were technically and financially able to implement
such a satellite." Id.
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States Constitution. 4' This advocacy is a variation of the
"free flow critique," a principle that labels such barriers
to the free flow of communications as intrusions upon
fundamental international human rights.42 This principle
is justified on the basis of Article 19 of the United Nations
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which confirms a
right to both send and receive information across national
boundaries. 43 Although the Universal Declaration is non-
binding, its advocates view it as a source of international
law.44
In support of this viewpoint, proponents argued the fol-
lowing: (1) technical and economic factors made the ap-
pearance of DBS unlikely in the near future; (2) any
regulations imposed upon the new technology could hin-
der its development and introduction; and (3) regulations
would obstruct information from flowing freely through-
out the world. 45 The flaw in the reasoning of the third
factor is that the Soviet bloc nations continue to argue
against any unlicensed broadcasting within their borders.
The Soviet Union, for example, has impeded the flow of
foreign broadcasting by using jamming techniques and
threatening the destruction of interfering satellites. 46 Al-
most half of the developing countries continue to censor
any programming that has been transmitted without prior
agreement or discussion regarding content guidelines.47
- Comment, The Heavenly Realm of Regulation: What Is The Outlook for DBS Now?,
52J. AIR L. & CoM. 221, 241 (1986). The United States, in other words, views
DBS program content regulations as unconstitutional attempts to limit rights to
free speech and press. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
42 Paul, supra note 37, at 345.
41 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 Y.B. ON HUM. RTS. 459, U.N. Doc.
A/81 1. Article 19 states that "[elveryone has the right to freedom of opinion and
expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and
to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regard-
less of frontiers." Id.
44 K. QUEENEY, supra note 2, at 15.
45 Id. at 37.
46 Paul, supra note 37, at 347.
47 Id. Although the degree of censorship varies, virtually all governments cen-
sor foreign broadcasting to some extent, which places serious doubt upon the
idea that any recognized international right to broadcast across national bounda-
ries exists. Id.
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In its purest sense, the free flow critique presumes that
both the developed nations and LDCs have the sophisti-
cated technological infrastructure to send as well as re-
ceive the flow of information.48 As a rule, however, the
Western media predominantly controls current broad-
casting technology and transmits information based upon
its own value system.49 The developing countries' access
to DBS is thereby limited and the spectrum of diversified
broadcasting is reduced. In essence, the proponents of
DBS regulation advocate respect for national sovereignty
through prior consent, and the opponents of regulation
emphasize the "free flow of information" as both an
American constitutional right and a human right recog-
nized in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.50
DBS discussions in the United Nations are generally
within the context of the United Nations involvement in
outer space affairs and the development of space law.
Both COPUOS and ITU have charted legal norms from
the existing framework of international public law, inter-
national private law, and national legislation. 51 The pub-
lic instruments applicable to DBS are relevant General
Assembly resolutions, the United Nations Charter, the
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in
the Exploration and Use of Outer Space Including the
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty),
and specific ITU Conventions and Radio Regulations.52
48 Id. at 346. "The free flow critique assumes an open marketplace of ideas
which bears little resemblance to the real world." Id.
49 Id. Professor Paul notes that LDC critics charge "that the Western press is
laden with liberal values historically tied to imperialism and that [W]estern report-
ing of the LDCs is inaccurate, incomplete, and biased." Id.
50 Id. at 345-47. For a discussion of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, see
supra note 43 and accompanying text.
5' K. QUEENEY, supra note 2, at 50. International public law, such as bilateral or
multilateral agreements, controls transactions between states, and international
private law controls the interactions between private parties in such matters as the
rights of broadcasters. Id.
52 Id. at 25. For a discussion of relevant UN resolutions, see infra notes 119-141
and accompanying text. For a discussion of the Outer Space Treaty, see infra
notes 133-134 and accompanying text. And, finally, for a discussion of the ITU
1990] 911
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III. STRATEGIES OF INTERNATIONAL BROADCAST
REGULATION
Having reviewed the arguments for and against DBS
regulation, the next question is, assuming DBS should be
regulated, whether control should be achieved by techni-
cal restrictions on satellite operation, content guidelines,
or prior consent requirements.
A. Technical Restrictions
Technical restrictions are used by the ITU to minimize
the problem of spillover in adjacent countries and to per-
mit the receiving country to decide what is permissible
program content.53 The 1971 World Administrative Ra-
dio Conference (1971 WARC) of the ITU adopted Radio
Regulations concerning the cessation of emissions by
space stations upon the objection of a receiving country.54
The purpose of the regulations was to reduce accidental
broadcast across national boundaries. 55 Specifically, Ra-
dio Regulation 428A56 required the spillover of a broad-
cast satellite signal into a neighboring state to be reduced
to the "maximum extent practicable," unless a prior
agreement was established with the receiving state.57
Spillover occurs when a country cannot physically radi-
ate to its own territory without broadcasting into a neigh-
boring country. The beam of a DBS is conical in shape
with a gradual fall-off from the core point of maximum
strength. 8 In achieving national coverage, the beam
often spills into regions of neighboring countries that
Convention and Radio Regulations, see infra notes 54-67 and 96-110 and accom-
panying text.
" Butler, supra note 26, at 93.
54 Id. at 96. "Space stations shall be fitted with devices to ensure immediate
cessation of their radio emissions by telecommand, whenever such cessation is
required under the provisions of these regulations." Administrative Regulations
(Radio Regulations), 1973, 23 U.S.T. 1527, T.I.A.S. No. 7935.
.- Butler, supra note 26, at 96.
56 Radio Regulations, supra note 54, No. 428A.
51 Butler, supra note 26, at 96; see also K. QUEENEY, supra note 2, at 87.
.1 K. QUEENEY, supra note 2, at 83-88. "The amount of spillover depends upon
several factors: the location and shape of the country, the diameter of the satellite
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stand within its field. If the DBS transmission is on the
same frequency band as the neighboring country, the spil-
lover will cause interference with the neighbor's broad-
casting services.59
Although 1971 WARC was concerned primarily with ra-
dio frequency coordination and notification procedures,
the states advocating the principles of state sovereignty
claimed that "prior consent" had been established by
Regulation 428A. 60 The regulation provides that "[i]n
devising the characteristics of a space station in the broad-
casting-satellite service, all technical means available shall
be used to reduce, to the maximum extent practicable, the
radiation over the territory of other countries unless an
agreement has been previously reached with such
countries." 6
Some nations view Regulation 428A as tantamount to
applying prior consent requirements to satellite broad-
casting into home receivers. 62 For example, in 1979 Swe-
den and Canada advocated that any direct television
broadcasting by satellite that was directed at a foreign en-
tity could only be established in a manner consistent with
relevant ITU provisions. 63 This proposition seemed to in-
dicate that DBS service could not proceed without compli-
ance with Regulation 428A.64
Although the United States participated in the 1971
conference adopting Regulation 428A, as well as the 1977
conference applying it, the United States maintains that
the regulation is strictly a technical guideline that does
not carry the force of international law.65 This position
was confirmed in a conversation with Federal Communi-
beam, the degree of the beam's falloff and the maintenance of the satellite's posi-
tion." Id. at 88.
59 Id.
-o Id. at 89.
61 Radio Regulations, supra note 54, No. 428A.
62 S. LUTHER, THE UNITED STATES AND THE DIRECT BROADCAST SATELLITE: THE
POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING IN SPACE 101 (1988).
6 Id.
' Id.
65 Id. at 102.
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cations Commission spokesman Steven Selwyn, who indi-
cated that DBS regulations treat spillover issues as
technical challenges. 6 That is, any legal questions on
spillover incidents are handled on a technical basis. Since
countries using DBS systems are required to install anten-
nae meeting minimum performance standards, a pre-
sumption of unintentional spillover exists.6 7
B. Program Content
The COPUOS Working Group on DBS has entertained
a number of proposals to control the political, cultural,
and commercial content of broadcast programs.6 8 In
1970 the Soviet Union proposed eight principles for con-
trolling content.69 The proposal advocated prohibition of
amoral or provocative broadcasts that might interfere
with a nation's way of life 0 The proposal also permitted
retaliation by "any available means" against direct broad-
casts transmitted without the prior consent of the receiv-
ing country. 7' If this provision were interpreted literally,
Telephone interview with Steven Selwyn, Federal Communications Commis-
sion, Washington, D.C. (March 1989).
67 Id.
68 See K. QUEENEY, supra note 2, at 58-60, 66-74, 97-111.
6 Model Principles for the Use of Artificial Earth Satellites for Radio and Television
Broadcasting, Report by COPUOS' Working Group on Direct Broadcast Satellites, U.N.
Doc. A/AC.195/WG.3/CRP.1 (1970) [hereinafter Soviet Model Principles]. The
provisions that most clearly identify the Soviet position are as follows:
Article IV. Direct radio and television broadcasts by satellite to the
population of a foreign State may be carried out only with the ex-
press consent of the Government of that State.
Article V .... Radio and television broadcasts by satellite which in-
clude propaganda in favour of war, militarism, Nazism, national and
racial hatred or hostility among peoples, and broadcasts which are
amoral or provocative in nature or which in any other manner tend
to interfere with the national life of States shall be deemed to be
illegal. ...
Article VII. In the event of direct broadcasts transmitted by satellite
to another country without the consent of its Government, that Gov-
ernment shall be entitled to use any available means to counteract
such broadcasts.
Id.; see QUEENEY, supra note 2, at 66.
10 Soviet Model Principles, supra note 69 art. V.
I7 d. art. VII.
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it would permit a receiving country to jam the radio waves
of illegal broadcasts and to destroy the offending satellite.
The Japanese were more specific in their suggested
prohibitions, which included the banning of war propa-
ganda, incitement to provoke subversive activities against
the political institutions of the receiving countries, slander
against the honor and dignity of the receiving countries,
and criticism of the policies of the receiving country.72
Both the 1972 and 1974 Soviet proposals presented to
the Working Group continued to emphasize the broad
principles of prior consent and control over the content of
political and commercial programming. 73 Little progress
was made because opponents of DBS regulations argued
that restrictions on program content would interfere with
the sovereign rights of states to administer their domestic
media systems and, as a result, impede the flow of infor-
mation. 74 No international consensus in favor of any pro-
posed guidelines governing program content came out of
these sessions.7 5
The only international agreement binding its member
states to content control was the Brussels Convention of
1974.76 The Convention, however, specifically exempted
DBS from its pronouncements.7 7 The purpose of the
Convention was to protect the property rights of copy-
righted materials in programs that were broadcast with
72 QUEENEY, supra note 2, at 73-74.
73 Paul, supra note 37, at 356. Jurisdictional control over program content con-
tinues to be a sensitive issue, particularly in the area of defamation by satellite. See
Cooper, Defamation by Satellite, 132 SOLIc. J. 1021 (1988). A Canadian court, in
Jenner v. Sun Oil Co., 2 D.L.R. 526, 537 (1952), recognized the rights of a plain-
tiff in the receiving country by holding that, even if the cause of action arose in a
foreign domicile, the origination of a broadcast beyond the jurisdiction of the
foreign forum is of no consequence as long as a case is established showing that
the signals were transmitted so as to be published within the jurisdiction thereby
causing substantial injury to the plaintiff's reputation within the jurisdiction.
74 Dauses, supra note 12, at 66.
75 Id.
76 Christol, The 1974 Brussels Convention Relating to the Distribution of Pro-
gram-Carrying Signals Transmitted by Satellite: An Aspect of Human Rights, 6J.
SPACE L. 23 (1978).
7 Id.
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the assistance of satellites other than DBS.78 The targeted
offenders were poachers who might use DBS systems to
intercept and rebroadcast such programs. 79 In their dis-
cussions, the delegates dealt with the issue of whether the
factors of program content and the available methods of
transmission should be treated separately in order to pro-
vide protection to the owner of the copyrighted materials
while at the same time allowing the prospective recipients
of such property to exercise their own judgments as to the
suitability of the programs. 80
The Brussels Conference tried to distinguish between
the intrinsic value of a program's content and the satel-
lites' technical ability to transmit the program.8 The So-
viet bloc countries lobbied for control over the program
content of the originating states, but the delegates elected
to deal only with the transmission of signals, not their
content.8 2 This content debate and the traditional argu-
ment for unimpeded delivery of programming defeated
the Soviet proposals and left the Convention with no in-
ternational consensus on DBS restrictions.83 On the
other hand, the Convention did not deter receiving states
from preventing the delivery of foreign-based programs.8 4
The Brussels Convention did provide monetary protec-
tions to the owners of copyrighted materials by requiring
the signatory states of the Convention to use reasonable
measures to prevent the distribution of such property to
unintended receivers within their designated jurisdic-
78 Id. "Property values exist in the product of human ingenuity and creativity
constituting the broadcast program." Id.
79 Id. at 33.
80 Id. at 23. "The subject of the treaty was not the content but the container."
Id. That is, the focus was not upon program content but upon signal
transmissions.
a1 Id.
82 Id. at 23-24.
85 Id.
84 Id. at 34. Because of the format ultimately adopted, participating States were
left to devise their own methods of dealing with the misuse of foreign programs.
Remedies could include "penal sanctions, withdrawal of benefits, registration re-
quirements, and other regulatory procedures." Id. at 25.
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tions.8 5 DBS systems were exempted from the Conven-
tion's final acts and left for negotiation in future sessions
of the COPUOS Working Group. 6
The reluctance of the international community to agree
on a set of content guidelines surfaced again in a working
draft contained in the 1980 COPUOS legal subcommittee
report. Once again, the stalemate was attributable to
the pluralistic nature of the international community
where the Western democracies' principles of free speech
were in direct conflict with the fear of offensive broadcasts
exhibited by the Soviet block and the LDCs. 8
C. Prior Consent
Another approach in controlling DBS transmissions has
been to require broadcasters to obtain the prior consent
of receiving countries before broadcasting.89 The re-
quirement would satisfy the LDCs' recognized rights to
regulate their telecommunications systems and to decide
what types of social, political, economic, and cultural pro-
gramming would be acceptable for their citizenry.90 The
Western countries have expressed the opposite view.
That is, Western governments believe that the prior con-
sent requirement would ultimately undermine the con-
cepts of freedom of information and the maintenance of
international peace and security.9' As in earlier sessions,
the freedom of information advocates supported their po-
sition with Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of
85 Id. at 33.
6 Id. at 34.
87 Report of COPUOS' Legal Subcommittee's Eighteenth Session, Annex II, Appendix
A, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/240 (1980).
88 Paul, supra note 37, at 357.
8, Comment, supra note 41, at 240. The prior consent requirement simply
forces any state intending to establish DBS service to immediately notify and gain
prior authorization from the receiving state.
90 Dauses, supra note 12, at 65.
91 Id. "State sovereignty was interpreted by the opponents to the prior consent
rule as compromising every state's right to maintain its domestic public media
system free from control or restrictions imposed by others, i.e., the receiving
states." Id. at 65-66.
1990] 917
918 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE
Human Rights.92
Three specific prior consent proposals have come out
of the debate on DBS regulation: Radio Regulation
428A,93 the UNESCO Declaration on the Use of Satellite
Broadcasting,94 and the General Assembly Resolution on
Principles Governing DBS.95
1. Radio Regulation 428A
The longstanding ITU regulations of terrestrial broad-
casting prohibit a state from intentionally or accidentally
broadcasting to another state with a signal strong enough
to interfere with the domestic broadcasting of the receiv-
ing state. 6 Radio Regulation 428A, as promulgated by
the ITU in 1972, 97 minimizes radio transmissions over
foreign countries through radio frequency coordination
and technical design, but the language of the regulation
poses the question of whether the receiving countries
gave ongoing consent to the broadcast and participation
in the programming.98 In the 1977 ITU report, the
United States, whose position rests upon an analogy to
the ITU regulations of terrestrial broadcasting, made the
argument that it was necessary to distinguish between di-
rect television broadcasts by satellite that were meant for
foreign states and those occurring as a result of uninten-
tional spillover.9 9 The United States emphasized that
92 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 43, art. 19.
Radio Regulations, supra note 54, No.428A.
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization's Declaration of
Guiding Principles on the Use of Satellite Broadcasting for the Free Flow of Information, the
Spread of Education and Greater Cultural Exchange, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 105/109 (1972)
[hereinafter UNESCO Declaration].
- G.A. Res. 37/92, U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 98, U.N. Doc. A/37/646
(1982).
96 S. LUTHER, supra note 62, at 103. The ITU "regulations ... prohibit a state
from broadcasting to another state, intentionally or accidentally, with a signal that
is strong enough to interfere with the domestic broadcasting of the recipient
state." Id.
97 Radio Regulations, supra note 54, No. 428A.
9m S. LUTHER, supra note 62, at 101-05 (discussing generally the ongoing contro-
versy over the right to prior consent generated by Radio Regulation 428A).
- Id. at 102.
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prior consent would apply to direct television broadcasts
and that ITU regulations would cover any technical is-
sues, such as unintentional spillover. 00
The "prior consent" debate of the 1970s heated up be-
cause of the Canadian-Swedish position that Regulation
428A had the effect of international law when applied to
DBS. 1 Article VI of the Canadian-Swedish proposal re-
quired respect for the receiving state not only in a case
where spillover might be considered technically avoidable
by ITU (Regulation 428A) but also where the spillover
might be technically unavoidable. 10 2 In addition, the lan-
guage of Article VI alluded to prior consent and the rights
of the receiving states.10 3
Opposing commentators, such as Carl Q. Christol, a
professor and consultant for the United States govern-
ment, reiterated that the position of the United States was
that the ITU lacked the power to make and enforce deci-
sions relating to international conduct because of its nar-
row concern with technical issues and notification
procedures. 0 4 The ITU could not resolve the prior con-
sent disagreement, Christol contended, because the
proper forum for "unacceptable ideas and information"
had always been, and should continue to be, within
COPUOS. 0 5 Some of the shortcomings of applying Reg-
I0o Id.
lo, Id. For a discussion of the Canadian-Swedish proposals, see supra notes 62-
64 and accompanying text.
02 Report by COPUOS' Working Group on Direct Broadcast Satellites, May 2, 1973,
U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/WG.3/14.
102 Id.
Article VI. The right of consent and participation stated in Article V
shall apply in these cases: (a) where coverage of the territory of a
foreign State entails radiation of the satellite signal beyond the limits
considered technically unavoidable under the Radio Regulations of
the International Telecommunication Union or (b) where . . . the
satellite broadcast is aimed specifically at an audience in that State
within the area of spillover.
Id.
104 S. LUTHER, supra note 62, at 104.
105 Id. The ITU submits issues to members and requires a majority to prevail.
But, COPUOS' practice is one of consensus. This operating difference may indi-
cate that COPUOS is the appropriate arena for the "prior consent" debate. Id.
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ulation 428A to prior consent requirements, however, in-
clude its failure to define what countries have standing to
insist on prior consent, what kind of agreement must be
reached to satisfy the regulation, and what sanctions are
imposed for noncompliance. t 6
As late as 1980, the United States arguments against
prior consent continued to support the "free flow" ap-
proach. 10 7 Specifically, the United States urged that a re-
quirement of prior consent could potentially extend
beyond satellite regulations to become a precedent gener-
ally restricting the flow of international information,
which would inhibit the free exchange of ideas. Insuffi-
cient experience with broadcasting was also cited as a jus-
tification for failing to support the proposed actions, and
the United States contended that such guidelines could
inhibit the advancement and testing of the technology.
Furthermore, adequate protections were purported to ex-
ist in the form of current ITU technical regulations that
govern unauthorized transmissions and avoid the need
for political principles. The ability to withhold consent
and deny regional broadcasts also could occur as a result
of political incompatibility between nations such that the
United States viewed the prior consent concept as practi-
cally unworkable. 08
Despite the United States position, as late as 1981, the
ITU frequency allocations had not been made for direct
broadcasting across national borders.' 0 9 In fact, the mem-
ber states of the ITU apparently were blocking legitima-
tion of an international DBS system in an attempt to force
the United States to agree with the prior consent principle
by withholding authorized allocations for DBS in the HF,
VHF, UHF, and microwave bands, which are the segments
best suited for direct television broadcasting into individ-
-o Paul, supra note 37, at 359.
107 S. LUTHER, supra note 62, at 105.
Io8 Id,
1- Id. at 103.
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ual receivers."10 As a result of these actions, the impasse
on prior consent became the thorny issue that continued
to delay international telecommunications between the
United States and LDCs.
2. The UNESCO Declaration On The Use of Satellite
Broadcasting
UNESCO completed its lengthy deliberations on the
DBS controversy with the adoption of the Declaration of
Guiding Principles on the Use of Satellite Broadcasting
for the Free Flow of Information, the Spread of Education
and Greater Cultural Exchange."' In Article IX the Dec-
laration specifies that "it is necessary that States, taking
into account the principle of freedom of information,
reach or promote prior agreements concerning direct sat-
ellite broadcasting to the population of countries other
than the country of origin of the transmission."
'
"12
Although not binding, the Declaration established an
international consensus encouraging states to reach prior
agreements before broadcasting and develop restrictions
on program content.' 13 The Declaration's ambiguity,
however, posed some of the same concerns surrounding
the requirements of Regulation 428A." 4 For example,
the prior consent requirements did not clarify whether the
broadcasters were to consult with only the target coun-
tries or whether they must consult with any country that
objected to the broadcast material in general.' ' 5 Further-
more, the Declaration failed to indicate whether the re-
ceiving countries had to be consulted beyond the initial
agreement or whether broadcasters could transmit at all if
no agreement was reached." 16
"° Id. at 104.
111 UNESCO Declaration, supra note 94.
112 Id.
115 S. LUTHER, supra note 62, at 85.
14 For a discussion of Radio Regulation 428A, see supra notes 54-67 and 96-
110 and accompanying text.
115 Paul, supra note 37, at 359.
116 Id.
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Article V of the Declaration implies that no prior con-
sent is required."t 7 It provides that "[t]he objective of sat-
ellite broadcasting for the free flow of information is to
ensure the widest possible dissemination ... of news of all
countries .... Satellite broadcasting . . . requires that
every effort be made to ensure the factual accuracy of the
information reaching the public.""" The exclusion of
program control for the recipient country leaves the im-
pression that prior consent is required but not in the con-
text of programming decisions.
3. The General Assembly Resolution
The most refined of the UN resolutions dealing with
prior consent is the 1982 Resolution of Principles Gov-
erning the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for
International Direct Television Broadcasting." 19 Adopted
over the objections of the United States and most of
Western Europe, 120 the resolution narrowed the DBS
agenda to four items of dispute. 12  First, disagreement
existed as to whether the resolution should mandate or
merely recommend acts of notice and consultation from
the broadcasting service to the receiving state. 22 But, the
language of the resolution is notably couched in
mandatory terms: "A State which intends to establish or
authorize the establishment of an international direct tele-
vision broadcasting satellite service shall without delay no-
tify the proposed receiving State or States of such
I17 UNESCO Declaration, supra note 94.
118 Id.
I19 Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for International
Direct Television Broadcasting, 37 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 98, U.N. Doc. A/37/
51 (1982) [hereinafter General Assembly Resolution 37/92].
120 See S. LUTHER, supra note 62, at 111-12. The requirement of consensus in all
COPUOS negotiations prevented the resolution from being presented to the
General Assembly as a COPUOS agreement. The impasse in COPUOS over prior
consent frustrated the Soviet Union delegation to the extent that it finally stepped
in and proposed a draft resolution before the General Assembly. Id. at I11.
12, Anawalt, Direct Television Broadcasting and the Quest for Communication Equality,




intention and shall promptly enter into consultation with
any of those States which so requests."'' 23 The final vote
on this provision split the international community, with
the developing nations casting the majority vote for
mandatory language.' 24
Second, the Resolution further calls for a prior consent
regime and states that an international DBS service will be
established only after the broadcasting and receiving
states enter into. consultations "regarding its activities in
the field of international direct television broadcasting by
satellite .... ,"25 The agreements between countries must
also conform to the pertinent requirements of the ITU.
126
While the resolution is not legally binding and does not
require "prior consent" per se, many of the developed na-
tions have remained dissatisfied with the lack of consensus
surrounding the resolution and the conspicuous absence
of any language supporting the principle of free flow of
information as advocated by the 1979 Canadian-Swedish
proposal to COPUOS. 127
The third point of dispute was the question of state re-
sponsibility for DBS transmissions. 2 8 Paragraph 8 of the
resolution approaches this issue with supplicatory lan-
guage: "States should bear responsibility for activities in
the field of international direct television broadcasting by
satellites carried out by them or under their jurisdiction
and for the conformity of any such activities with the prin-
ciples set forth in this document."'' 29 The Canadian-Swiss
dissent against state responsibility was the most vocal be-
cause government censorship could potentially curtail the
free flow of information. 30
M" General Assembly Resolution 37/92, supra note 119, at 98 (emphasis
added).
124 Anawalt, supra note 121, at 366.
125 General Assembly Resolution 37/92, supra note 119, at 98.
,26 Id. at 98-99.
127 Anawalt, supra note 121, at 366; see also Paul, supra note 37, at 361.
128 Anawalt, supra note 121, at 366-67.
129 General Assembly Resolution 37/92, supra note 119, at 98 (emphasis
added).
13o Anawalt, supra note 121, at 367.
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The fourth area of debate was the reluctance of the de-
veloping nations to accept the United States position that
international law should apply to DBS regulation.' 3' The
United States viewpoint was that international law would
not support state responsibility or the type of nontechni-
cal prior agreements called for in the Resolution.13 2 The
United States argued that DBS was sufficiently regulated
by general international law as provided in article VI of
the Outer Space Treaty. 33 The Treaty provides that in-
ternational responsibility for telecommunications is borne
by the organization carrying out the satellite activities
(such as INTELSAT, EUTELSAT, ARABSAT and others)
and the participating States that are parties to the
Treaty. 134 Despite this argument, the United States could
not assure a consensus on the free flow of information
principle.13 5 Therefore, lip service was given reluctantly
to the concept of prior consultation, and in doing so, the
United States again stepped away from its elusive goal of
unimpeded transnational communications. 3 6
Although General Assembly Resolution 37/92 is not le-
gally binding, its interpretation supports several argu-
ments. First, it is advocated that, even in the absence of
an agreement, DBS cannot be used without prior con-
sent. 3 7 Second, DBS transmissions to the noncomplying
country constitute "harmful interference" and are there-
fore prohibited by the International Telecommunications
Convention.13  A rebuttal argument is that, other than
technical restrictions, no theory of international law bars
",' Id.
132 Id. • Some observers thought that the United States might be willing to ac-
cept a consensus draft as long as it relied primarily on existing international regu-
lation of the radio spectrum. Id.
" Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outerspace, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27,
1967, United States-United Kingdom-USSR, art. VI, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 2415,
T.I.A.S. No. 7347 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
- Id., 18 U.S.T. at 2415; N. MArrE, supra note 12, at 82.
1-1 Anawalt, supra note 121, at 367.
1S- Id. at 368.
157 Paul, supra note 37, at 362.
1-8 International Telecommunications Convention, Final Protocol, Additional
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international DBS broadcasts.' 3 9 Despite these remaining
conflicts, the Resolution did much to reaffirm the interde-
pendence of nations in global communications by focus-
ing upon the necessity of all nations to practice
accommodation and understanding, which will facilitate
an inoffensive exchange of cultural and educational
information.' 40
This review of the initiatives supporting a unified global
DBS system has brought a multitude of both positive and
negative implications. The political barriers of spillover,
national sovereignty, free flow of information, prior con-
sent, and program content have put the future of DBS
globalization into question. Ironically, INTELSAT has
lost its monopoly status as other regional and national
satellite systems have been launched and placed in higher
frequencies of the radio spectrum.' 4' Several recent de-
velopments, however, may indicate a need to move for-
ward with a globalization plan in which a common carrier
is operated via individual regional systems.
IV. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Recent events have highlighted additional concerns that
must be addressed as DBS continues to develop. First,
Third World countries have expanded their use of tele-
communications in an attempt to attain a greater voice in
world affairs.' 42 As a result, they are calling for some
form of planning to ensure equitable access to the geosta-
tionary orbit and frequency spectrum resources required
for satellite communication. 43 The access debate centers
Protocols, Optional Additional Protocol, Resolutions, Recommendations and
Opinions, 1982, art. 35; see Paul, supra note 37, at 362.
1"9 Paul, supra note 37, at 362. Technical restrictions are supplied by Radio
Regulation 428A. Id. For a discussion of Radio Regulation 428A, see supra notes
54-67 and accompanying text.
140 Powell, Towards A Negotiable Definition of Propaganda for International Agreements
Related to Direct Broadcast Satellites, 45 LAW & CoNTEMP. PRoBS. 3, 34-35 (1982).
141 W. HOWELL, supra note 6, at 253.
342 S. AYALA, supra note 11, at 6.
143 See Use of the Geostationary-Satellite Orbit and the Planning of the Space
Services Utilizing It, 2 FCC Rcd. 3843, 3844 (1987) (describing groups to study
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upon the "first come, first served" orbital assigning pro-
cess, which has heretofore resulted in limited access to the
LDCs incapable of building, launching, and maintaining
such systems.144 The utilization of the geostationary orbit
fuels the debate because only a limited number of satel-
lites can be placed in the orbit without causing mutual in-
terferences.1 45 Proposals for orbital allocation are also
considered in light of national claims to portions of the
geostationary orbit. 4 6 These fractured negotiations will
not reach compromise without greater international
cooperation.
Second, the program of implementing national DBS
systems has not been as lucrative as originally antici-
pated.' 47 For example, the withdrawal of DBS applicants
in the United States illustrates the economic restraints
and financial uncertainties of establishing effective DBS
systems.' 48 In addition, technological and economic DBS
allocation and use of geostationary satellite orbits); see also Mahoney, "Space
WARC" '85: Negotiating Competitive Forces, J. COMMUNICATIONS, Summer 1985, at 60
(discussing the 1985 World Administrative Radio Conference).
'44 B. SIGNITZER, REGULATION OF DIRECT BROADCASTING FROM SATELLITES 12
(1976). While the "first come, first served" policy allows each nation an equal
chance to acquire the slots available, opponents argue that the 180 available geos-
tationary orbital spaces are a limited natural resource of all mankind. As such, a
cooperative effort should emerge to ensure access to countries with limited tech-
nology. Id. at 12-13.
145 Gorbiel, The Legal Status of Geostationary Orbit: Some Remarks, 6J. SPACE L. 171
(1978).
146 Current Documents, The Bogota Declaration, 6J. SPACE L. 193 (1978). In De-
cember 1976, seven equatorial countries issued the Bogota Declaration claiming a
right of permanent sovereignty over the portions of the GSO directly above their
respective territories. Id. The Declaration embodies five principles. First, the
GSO is defined as a natural resource derived from the earth's gravitational pull
and "an integral part of the territory over which the equatorial States exercise
their national sovereignty." Id. Second, those segments of the GSO that corre-
spond to areas of the high seas are "the common heritage of mankind." Id. at 195.
Third, the equatorial countries will permit other countries' satellites to pass above
their territories only if outside of their GSO. Fourth, satellites can enter the GSO
over an equatorial country only with the prior and express permission of that
country and are subject to the national laws of that country. Fifth, prior use of a
portion of the GSO by a foreign country does not confer any present or future
right to the use of the orbit. Id. at 194-95.
,47 Anderson, The Economic, Legal and Scientific Implications of Direct Broadcast Satel-
lites, COMM. & LAw, Feb. 1985, at 3, 5.
148 Id.
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requirements, competition from existing media, and ris-
ing construction costs are all affecting the success of a na-
tional DBS system.' 49 The benefits of these start-up and
maintenance expenses may only be cost-effective in an in-
ternational system.
Third, the shift toward privatization of European re-
gional DBS systems has triggered concerns about compe-
tition and coordination. 150  As privatization activity
increases in anticipation of the 1992 European Economic
Community unified market, the variable regulatory sys-
tems of participating countries are complicating the oper-
ation of national systems.'" The transition from state to
private ownership will necessitate cooperation and coor-
dination between regional and national systems.
Fourth, the International Telecommunications Union
By September 1983, eight companies, including [Satellite Television
Corporation, a subsidiary of COMSAT], had been granted condi-
tional construction permits to build DBS systems.... Only three of
the original eight companies are expected to actually establish DBS
networks, while the three wealthiest applicants-CBS, RCA (parent
company of NBC), and Western Union-withdrew their applications
on grounds that such a television medium was not economically
viable.
Id. (footnotes omitted). See also Launch Failures Changing Satellite Business, BROAD-
CASTING, July 14, 1986, at 57 (discussing the impact of launch failures upon com-
panies' decisions not to invest in new satellites).
49 Anderson, supra note 147, at 8. For example, a single nationally offered DBS
channel, according to satellite manufacturer RCA, has operating costs of approxi-
mately $30 million annually, but leases for the C-band satellite channels that are
currently used by television networks and cable average only $1.5 million. " 'The
high cost of DBS makes it a questionable venture,' claims Rick Boyland, broad-
casting manager of RCA Americom. 'When you look at the presence of cable...
and new video technologies such as multi-point distribution . . . that means an
awful lot of competition.' " Id. In 1982, the cost of constructing two DBS satel-
lites, one to transmit in the eastern half of the United States and the other to use
as a spare, was $113 million. Id. "Actual construction costs total[ed] over $60
million with another $53 million being charged for developmental and perform-
ance costs." Id.
ISO Will DBS in Europe Meet the Same Fate as in U.S.?, BROADCASTING,.Jan. 27,
1986, at 58 (reviewing problems of competition for market share between DBS
operators and established terrestrial broadcasters).
15, The Privatization of Europe, BROADCASTING, Mar. 31, 1986, at 61 (summarizing
European telecommunications developments); see also In Brief, BROADCASTING,
Mar. 20, 1989, at 16 (reporting that demand for orbital slots above the United
States exceeds availability).
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has come under pressure from insurgent commercial and
political interests of Third World countries. 5 2 In particu-
lar, the political conflicts over Third World access to the
geostationary orbit turned the 1985 World Administrative
Radio Conference (WARC-85) into a confrontation of
politics and ideology.15 3 The recent threat of a United
States withdrawal from the ITU may encourage the group
to limit its involvement to the technical operation of radio
services rather than the brokering of equitable access.
1 54
These recent developments add to the longstanding
concerns regarding spillover, national sovereignty, and
prior consent. Improvements in signal-scrambling tech-
nology and constraints on receive-only satellite dishes,
however, may help to resolve the concerns about global
DBS systems. 5 5 With these present barriers to a global
DBS system in mind, the next section explores why DBS
globalization is realistic and necessary for international
accord.
V. ADVANTAGES OF A GLOBAL DBS SYSTEM
Theoretically, there are at least four primary advan-
tages to the globalization of DBS systems. First, DBS
technology can eliminate the need for countries facing
natural and man-made barriers to construct high-cost, ter-
restrial communication networks. That is, unlike DBS,
conventional telecommunications systems are impeded by
the impenetrable barriers of buildings and indigenous
deserts, mountain ranges, and rivers.
Furthermore, the construction and maintenance of
152 Mahoney, supra note 143, at 60-61.
" Curtain Going Up on Space WARC, BROADCASTING, Aug. 5, 1985, at 74 (summa-
rizing the controversies as they existed immediately preceding the conference).
-5" Comment, supra note 41, at 242; see also Comment, Direct Broadcast Satellites:
Protecting Rights of Contributing Artists and Broadcast Organizations, 12 CAL. W. INT'L
L.J. 213 (1982) (discussing problems with regulation of the content of DBS
transmissions).
15 See Powell, supra note 140, at 31-32. "The success of the ITU in achieving
general international agreement on many of these specific matters lends hope for
resolving the problems of acceptable DBS programming." Id.
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cables and wires to facilitate audio, data, and voice trans-
missions becomes economically prohibitive as the conduc-
tors stretch across continents. Unlike cable transmission,
satellites can deliver messages to multiple targets from a
single point. 156 As previously noted, the launching of a
global DBS network is extremely expensive, but the dis-
tance between transmissions has little impact on operat-
ing costs and the ongoing equipment needs are minimal.
Moreover, DBS satellites are the only technology available
that radiate enough power to cover a large geographic
area and provide sufficient signals to penetrate small
ground equipment. 57 Just one DBS transponder can
transmit both radio and television programs to an entire
country thereby linking hundreds of cities to its recep-
tion.5 " This high capacity makes DBS the most oppor-
tune means for establishing a telecommunications
network--domestically, regionally, and globally.
A second advantage of globalization is that DBS sys-
tems promote informational and cultural exchanges as
well as contribute to economic development. DBS broad-
casting would impact the world economy by expanding
the local marketplace to worldwide proportions. Interna-
tional franchises and subsidiaries could reach a wider
market and thereby increase their profits. Competition
would also increase as a result of the international con-
sumer's direct access to price and product information.
All the activity surrounding the dissemination of informa-
tion would stimulate further growth in various economic
sectors.159
Third, the globalization of DBS can encourage growth
156 See Payne, supra note 7, at 98 (Cable proponents argue that, despite the sin-
gle point to multiple target capability of satellites, new optical glass fiber cables
provide faster, clearer transmissions that cannot be tapped.).
157 See generallyJ. BITrNER, BROADCASTING AND TELECOMMUNICATION 151 (1985)
(presenting an overview of several types of DBS systems and applications).
158 B. SIGNrrZER, supra note 144, at 10-11.
159 SeeJ. BITrNER, supra note 157, at 155. "Theoretically, a popular world pro-
gram produced by a small less-developed country, could attract enough world
advertising to affect that country's balance of payments." Id.
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in the political sector. Not only is this telecommunica-
tions system an excellent method for politically unstable
countries to centralize diverse minorities, but it is espe-
cially critical to the security of governments who must rely
upon international communications with their allies and
military forces.' 60 As a result, global DBS systems be-
come a vital link to economic and political stability and
growth. Therefore, the political growth stemming from
DBS globalization would be transnational in scope, reach-
ing both developed and underdeveloped nations.
Finally, DBS is an excellent broadcasting alternative for
the dissemination of entertainment, educational, and in-
structional programming. Perhaps the most promising
advantage of a global DBS system is its capability to edu-
cate the world. For example, satellite-borne educational
television could function to reduce illiteracy, provide uni-
versal primary education, extend secondary and higher
education, increase present educational systems' ef-
ficency, and equalize educational opportunities in devel-
oping countries.1 6'
Significant satellite projects have also been initiated to
improve medical care and education by providing in-
creased access to doctors and medical personnel.1 62 An
example of this effort was the Rural Satellite Program, fi-
nanced by the United States Agency for International De-
velopment, through which educators and physicians in
Peru received programs covering in-service training,
premedical treatment diagnoses, and general information
sessions.' 63 Such initiatives point to the value of provid-
ing DBS services to underdeveloped areas that deserve
6 See generally A. BRANSCOMB, TOWARD A LAW OF GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS
NETWORKS 217, 217-21 (1986). The United States government, in conducting for-
eign and military affairs, represents the largest single user of telecommunications
in the world. Id.
161 B. SIGNITZER, supra note 144, at 14.
162 Id. at 15.
,63 Smith, Reaching Those Hard to Get Places, INT'LJ. SATELLITE COMM., Nov. 1985,
at 31.
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greater access to the existing global telecommunications
networks.
The consummate example of DBS potential for LDCs
was the Satellite Instructional Television Experiment
(SITE). The NASA Application Technology Satellite
(ATS-6) was placed in orbit over Kenya to broadcast pro-
grams on modern health, hygiene, and agricultural prac-
tices to remote villages in India. t6' For the first time, all
regions of India were merged into a national information
network. The success of this experiment shows that DBS
technology is an efficient and effective method for linking
isolated regions and establishing political and cultural
unity.
The implementation of a global DBS system brings with
it a number of concerns that are currently hindering inter-
national cooperation. In analyzing these concerns, the
following sections compare the problems facing a fixed
satellite system (FSS), such as INTELSAT, with those
faced by a broadcast satellite system (BSS), such as the
proposed global DBS system.165 The following discussion
deals with the central concerns of competition, coordina-
tion, and equitable access. Methods by which a global
DBS system can cope with these concerns are also
presented.
A. Competition
The INTELSAT monopoly within the international
telecommunications market has gradually been eroded
through increased competition from regional (for-profit)
satellite systems such as ARABSAT and EUTELSAT. 66
J. BITrNER, supra note 157, at 145; see also B. SIGNrrZER, supra note 144, at 15-
16.
165 W. HOWELL, supra note 6, at 247. The fixed satellite system (FSS) relays
telephone, data, and radio signals from one point to another (point-to-point) or to
many other ground stations (multipoint). A broadcast satellite system (BSS)
transmits radio and television signals from a number of originating programming
services to other terrestrial broadcast or cable transmitters. Direct broadcast
satellites (DBS) beam radio and TV program signals from originating stations di-
rectly to homes via high-powered satellite transmitters. Id.
16 Snow, Arguments For and Against Competition in International Satellite Facilities and
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In addition, the deregulatory climate of the Reagan ad-
ministration allowed the Federal Communications Com-
mission (FCC) to grant qualifying authority to five United
States companies to compete with INTELSAT.' 61
Deregulation is advocated by developed countries be-
cause competition will likely mean higher quality trans-
missions and lower prices. 16 " This will in turn make the
technology more financially accessible to more users.
Under INTELSAT's present nondiscriminatory price
averaging, charges for circuit use are identical for both
low-volume and high-volume users. 69  The query is
whether the competition will prevent INTELSAT from
meeting the needs of a low-cost system in LDCs. The
large receiving dishes necessary for systems like INTEL-
SAT may become too expensive for many countries.17 0
These shortcomings may add up to cost inequities for
LDCs.
Competition also puts pressure on existing organiza-
tions to be innovative and price their products according
to specific market costs rather than to achieve monopoly
level profits."'7 Furthermore, the entry of new systems
into the international market can facilitate not only tech-
Services: A U.S. Perspective, J. COMMUNICATIONS, Summer 1985, at 51, 51-59; see also
In Brief, BROADCASTING, Mar. 20, 1989, at 16.
Cable News Network became first non-INTELSAT video service
provider from U.S. to Latin America in December 1988 after deal
with Pan American Satellite Corp. PanAmSat saw its first satellite,
PAS 1, go into orbit June 15, 1988, aboard Airanespace rocket
launched from Kourou, French Guiana. The satellite is intended to
provide domestic services in South American countries as well as in-
ternational services.
Id.
167 PanAmSat Signs Peru as First Partner, BROADCASTING, Apr. 14, 1986, at 44-45;
see also Payne, supra note 7, at 94.
16 Payne, supra note 7, at 94.
- W. HOWELL, supra note 6, at 253.
170 Anderson, supra note 147, at 7 n.12. "The larger the receiving dish, the
higher the cost. DBS dishes will allegedly be sold for $400-$600. More realistic
figures put the price tag closer to $500-$800. Dishes for medium powered satel-
lites sell for between $800-$1,000 while low-powered satellites range in cost from
$1,000-$3,000." Id.
,7, Snow, supra note 166, at 69.
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nological progress and competitive pricing but also an in-
creased diversity and choice of systems.' 712 The LDCs that
oppose deregulation argue that natural monopolies foster
economies of scale and instill favorable organizational
customs and preferences. 73 This schism of thought con-
tinues to hamper international progress for DBS systems.
Nevertheless, competition concerns can be dealt with
by a global DBS organization in several ways, including
the following: implementation of a pricing system that
shows the realistic demand-supply situation for regional
and national users; initiation of periodic cost and technol-
ogy studies to prevent cream-skimming 74 and to promote
technological development; and provision of financing al-
ternatives and incentives to nations in need. 75
B. Coordination
The privatization of telecommunications systems, such
as the Japanese Nippon Telegraph and Telephone System
and similar actions in France, Spain, and Sweden, portend
the governmental release of bureaucratic and executive
control over their DBS telecommunications systems. 176
As this race towards space accelerates, the need for coor-
dination is critical to deal with such issues as spillover, na-
tional sovereignty, and prior consent. Despite the UN
initiatives targeting these issues, solutions are not guaran-
teed. 17 7 The rush for privatization highlights these con-
cerns and makes the search for alternatives even more
urgent. That is, decisions as to what measures will ade-
quately diminish the problems of coordination are essen-
tial to the development of a global DBS system.
172 Id. at 68-69.
173 See generally id. at 69.
174 Id. at 65-66. Cream-skimming refers to the underpricing rate structures
used by competitors on heavy routes, such as the North Atlantic or Pacific traffic,
which causes the existing international system to lose profits needed to subsidize
thin routes. Id.
175 For a further discussion of INTELSAT defenses against competitive forces,
see Snow, supra note 166, at 65-68.
176 In Brief, supra note 151, at 16.
177 W. HOWELL, supra note 6, at 264-269.
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To thwart reception of certain broadcasts by illegal
satellites, regional systems, such as ARABSAT, are pres-
ently scrambling their uplink telemetry systems to ob-
struct interferences with spacecraft.178 Scrambling also
reduces the spillover of unacceptable television program-
ming by other countries with the same satellite footprint.
The use of a common-carrier system, such as INTELSAT,
but with a global or regional scope, could resolve the
problem of program content because individual countries
could make autonomous programming decisions. Fur-
thermore, regulation of receive-only dishes could reduce
spillover.179 For example, Pan-European telecasts from
foreign systems are limited because of a recent ban on re-
ceive-only receptors. 8 0 Although scrambling technology
and equipment regulation may increase the initial costs of
a global DBS system, participating nations would absorb
the costs, which would seem to preserve the national sov-
ereignty of those countries concerned with cooperation
and coordination activities.
C. Equitable Access
A third concern directly related to the function of the
ITU is the equitable distribution of the slots in the geosta-
tionary orbit.' 8 ' The focus is upon how to make the
wealth and technology of the West more accessible to
Third World countries without encouraging their depen-
dence upon and subjection to Western culture and capi-
tal. The United States objects to the "a priori" planning
solution, which would allot orbital slots to countries on an
equal basis without regard to their ability to use them. 182
178 ARABSAT Satellite's Control Signals Will Be Encrypted, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH.,
May 21, 1984, at 176, 176-77.
,79 The Privatization of Europe, supra note 151, at 61.
180 Id.
18, S. LUTHER, supra note 62, at 144. More than 150 satellites now operate in
the orbit, and they are owned primarily by INTELSAT or the United States.
Therefore, the United States denounces the call for allocation of slots on an equal
basis without considering the needs or capabilities of the country. Id.
182 Id.
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The United States argument is that advancing technology
will allow the placement of satellites just two, rather than
three or four, degrees apart, which will make more room
when it is actually needed. Other nations, however, are
demanding an end to the current "first come, first served"
policy prevailing in ITU regulations.1
3
Although the allocation of DBS channels and orbital
spaces among regional countries has resolved these con-
flicts to some extent, 8 4 the globalization of a DBS system
may conserve geostationary orbit allocation more effec-
tively. This globalization could be accomplished by first
establishing regional, multi-administrative entities to alle-
viate allocations for national DBS systems. The result
would be equitable access for the LDCs and developed
nations alike. In addition, the grouping of several nations
into a regional system could reduce the financial burden a
nation normally would have in developing its own na-
tional DBS network. Multinational meetings also could be
held to coordinate the requirements of each nation's DBS
system and its geostationary orbit allocation.18 5
In sum, the primary objectives of a global DBS system
are to prevent competitive strongholds, coordinate activi-
ties of privatization, and ensure access to all. The political
conflicts that have delayed the implementation of a global
DBS system, however, also will require concerted negotia-
tions and common international goals.
VI. Emerging Technology
While the focus of this article has been upon what enti-
ties will control global DBS systems, the issues of prior
consent and access to the geostationary orbit have conse-
quences for other types of international satellite telecom-
munications, such as FSS and BSS. 186 The following
183 Id.
'8 Space WARC Reaches a Consensus, BROADCASTING, Sept. 16, 1985, at 41.
185 The Privatization of Europe, supra note 151, at 61.62.
186 S. LuTHER, supra note 62, at 136. For a discussion of FSS and BSS, see supra
note 165 and accompanying text.
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dis'cussion will review some of the emerging technology
and how it will affect the world politics surrounding the
development of satellite communications.
One technological trend is the increased usage of small,
less-costly earth station dish antennae, which are now be-
ing used for satellite radio and television transmissions.
Utilization of these antennae for transmissions is made
possible by an ultrahigh-frequency range ("Ku-Band"). 87
As a result, the lower cost will generate greater demand
by the world's population. Also, the use of analog and
digital transmissions, whereby the video portion of a tele-
cast is accompanied by an audio in several languages, has
reduced the language barriers that would normally inhibit
telecasting into foreign countries. The viewer is free to
make his choice of language. 8 8
Digital transmissions have also led to the emergence of
a technology called "enhanced" or "high-definition" tele-
vision (HDTV), which results in a superior television pic-
ture. 8 9 These improved video transmissions are possible
through the use of extremely high microwave frequencies
(in the gigahertz range). The catch is that the "high-defi-
nition" signals require a different type of television receiv-
ing set from those currently used in the United States. 90
Removal of this reception barrier would require world-
wide agreement on a single standard for receiving sets.
Another notable trend is the rapid evolution of sound
broadcasting via DBS, which requires either new radios or
frequency converters for the adaptation of conventional
radio sets to higher wavelengths.' 9' Radio DBS requires
,87 S. LUTHER, supra note 62, at 137.
188 Id.
,89 Id. Japan has been a forerunner in "high-definition" television technology,
which involves a digital system of signal projection and processing. The system
transmits signals by digital code, which is the format used in computers, rather
than by the analog system, which is a continuous electronic signal. The television
screen, in effect, becomes the display component of a minicomputer. Id. at 185
n. 1.
-0 Id. at 137. Segments of the spectrum have been specifically allotted to ex-
perimentation with direct radio-signal transmissions via satellite. Id.
- Id.
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less bandwidth space in the geostationary orbit than does
television DBS, and thus it may be more cost-effective. 192
Operations, however, must be in accord with ITU rules
and regulations.
VII. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
The accelerated demands of developing nations for
emerging space-based telecommunications services and
the requirements of international regulatory initiatives are
limiting the options of the United States in its effort to
disseminate worldwide information. It will become more
difficult for the United States to justify its unfettered ap-
proach in international communications without prior
agreement with other countries. The demand for more
equitable access to the channels of information will con-
tinue as long as the developing nations see their survival
and development dependent upon the substantive flow of
information.
Conversely, the launching of satellite systems may be
beyond the reach of the nations that are in greatest need
of survival information systems. The enormous cost and
inherent power of such systems may preserve the status
quo for the Western cultures who want to expand their
markets and extend the standards of Western ideology.
This position is reinforced by the world role of the United
States through its military control of information systems.
The probability of equalizing this control is questionable
in light of the prolonged confrontation that will continue
within the international bodies of the United Nations.
Telecommunications technology has become an inte-
gral component in these times of rapid information dis-
semination and social change. As the technology gains
momentum, traditional standards and centers of control
will be affected. International agreements and regulatory
bodies will no longer stem the tide of social and cultural
change. The changes are imminent. The question is
192 Id.
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whether the hand of censorship will overcome the positive
results of information globalization.
In assessing the future of international programming by
DBS systems, the focus shifts to the United Nations and
its ability to debate and .reach compromise on the issues
of prior consent, national sovereignty, program content,
and equitable access to the technology. On balance, the
decades of negotiations and resulting resolutions in both
ITU and UNESCO should be judged as solid achieve-
ments. Unfortunately, the lack of consensus falls short of
the goal of international cooperation, but a suggested
mode of cooperation has been set forth in which broad-
casters and receiving states can work successfully.
The current state of telecommunications development
reasonably suggests that international direct television
broadcasting is near fruition. Nevertheless, governments
in power may be tempted to employ censorship, and if so,
their efforts must be met head on with all the persuasion
that progressive nations can muster. Certainly, the con-
cern of individual countries about the intrusion of foreign
cultures is understandable. Likewise, the threat of cul-
tural standardization is a valid one. The natural reaction
to censor, however, should be met by a recognition of the
need of all peoples to express and continue to develop
their own national ideas.
